For the first time in human history virologists have the knowledge about the avian origin of pandemic influenza A viruses. Furthermore, in the last two decades a new class of anti influenza drugs, the neuraminidase inhibitors (NIs), has been developed from an academic discovery to a series of antiviral drugs to be used in the clinic. At present vaccinologists are producing influenza A (H5N1) vaccines to be stockpiled alongside the NIs to combat the first wave of an anticipated influenza pandemic. Studies from the 1918 infection calamity, the Spanish influenza, and the succeeding pandemics of 1957 and 1968, all caused by avian influenza A viruses, have shown how quickly such a virus can mutate to become less virulent (starting with 50% case fatality) and more infectious. Such a mutation cluster could lead to a rapid increase in world deaths, currently 170, to many millions. However there are optimistic analyses: judicious and swift application of NIs, vaccine and hygiene to an outbreak epicentre, most likely in South-East Asia, could break the chain of transmission.
In the last decade of the 19th century a worldwide influenza pandemic virus was triggered by an H3 virus (Taubenberger J & Oxford JS, unpublished data) , whilst the three pandemics of the 20 th century were triggered by H1N1, the Great Spanish Pandemic of 1918; H2N2, the Asian Pandemic (1957) ; and again H3, Hong Kong or Mao Pandemic (1968) . We now know that these viruses originated from the gene pool of avian influenza viruses and adapted to become pathogens of humans. So why should the 21st century be spared? Obviously the world can never be free of the threat but, as with other infectious diseases, once the precise transmission route is established then steps can be taken to reduce the risk of infection. Nineteenth century politicians reacted quickly when it became known from the work of bacteriologists that cholera and typhoid were water-borne bacterial diseases; the large cities of Europe benefit still from the huge investment in the sewage and water systems. Likewise, the back of yellow fever was broken by vaccination and mosquito control, and polio by sewage control plus administration of vaccine (reviewed by Collier & Oxford, 2006) . The absence of a significant animal reservoir for these diseases undoubtedly contributed to our success in this area. So where does influenza fit into the world of infection? For the first time in human history, we know the source of influenza A pandemics: all known influenza viruses, H1-16 and N1-9, in virtually all combinations coexist and spread, often quietly, in the 50-billion migrating geese, ducks and swans (Webster, et al. 2006 ). The infection is not respiratory, but enteric in these birds and so the virus is excreted in droppings, and contaminates feathers. The route to humans is likely to involve a bridging host such as domesticated turkeys, ducks, chickens and, possibly, pigs (reviewed by Stuart-Morris et al. [1985] ). The scale of the current H5N1 epidemic in poultry and wild birds is unprecedented. Wild bird migration is very likely to be involved in virus dissemination across continents, but so, potentially, is transport of poultry products. How turkeys, in so-called biosecure units in the UK, became infected is still unknown. Small local birds or mammals undoubtedly can carry contaminated feathers, straw or faeces, and so introduce infection from areas visited by the larger virus-excreting migrators. However, the absence of infection elsewhere in the UK suggests that wild birds are probably not to blame in this case. Elsewhere, live bird markets, where chickens are slaughtered and dismembered, are weak links in our defences and are of particular concern. Therefore, the modern equivalent of the 19th century public health response to water-borne diseases is to prevent infection of domesticated birds by keeping them well away from migrating birds, a reversal of the recent trend towards free-range production. Better hygiene practices and education about the risks faced by people handling poultry should be encouraged. In the face of the current H5N1 problem, the use of face masks and goggles, vaccination and antiviral prophylaxis is a sensible precaution for those exposed to potentially infected birds. In the UK there are around 100,000 people in daily contact with 150-million domesticated birds. In contrast, in south-east Asia there are one-billion people in daily contact with at least one-billion domesticated birds. Therefore, south-east Asia is statistically more likely to be the epicentre for virus mutation to allow the emergence of person-to-person spread (Webster et al., 2006) . However, statistics and mathematics can be misleading. Who, for example, would have considered three women who plucked feathers from four dead migratory swans last year in Azerbaijan would have died from H5N1? It is also quite clear that a parallel spread happens in the huge international poultry industry with intercontinental movement of feathers, eggs, processed poultry and live birds. There is also a considerable illicit international market in wild birds and fighting cockerels. No mathematical model can take account of all these variables, and predict where or when H5N1 will become competent for human-to-human transmission.
Furthermore, not all pandemics of the past started in south-east Asia. Our own studies of the precise origin of the 1918 pandemic point towards the vast sprawling hospital and army training complex stretching for tens of miles around Etaples in northern France, which daily housed 100,000 exhausted young soldiers alongside pigs, horses, ducks and geese. Many of the soldiers had a compromised respiratory system because of the 115,000 tons of 23 different varieties of gas used in the Somme battlefield by all sides. The overcrowded camp was, and still is, on the flight path of influenza viruscarrying geese and ducks flying southwards on migration, and there is clear photographic evidence of soldiers plucking geese and turkeys. Perhaps with hindsight and our new knowledge of the avian reservoir, it is not so surprising that in the winter of 1916 a new respiratory disease began to emerge in the camp (Hammond et al., 1917; Abrahams et al., 1919) . There were around 140 deaths and the case fatality was 50%, remarkably similar to comparable figures today of H5N1 in south-east Asia (Tran et al., 2004) . The clinical pictures with heliotrope cyanosis and pneumonia were no different from the great autumn wave of the autumn of 1918 (Taubenberger et al., 2005) , but this was the pre-emptive strike by the virus. Today, many question whether there should be concern over the 163 deaths in the world from H5N1. However, the Etaples example illustrates the masterly ability of influenza A virus to mutate into a virus capable of global transmission. This despite an apparently modest reproductive number (R o ) of about 2, but compensated for by a short incubation period of only 2-3 days (Ferguson et al., 2005) . It is presumed that mutations near the receptor-binding site in the haemagglutinin (HA) molecule will enable the virus to bind more easily to α2-6 receptors on human cells in the respiratory tract rather than α2-3 receptors in avians. It is also presumed that several other mutations speed up viral replication, such as mutations in PB2, an RNA polymerase gene, and even in NS1, which normally can shut down one arm of the host's innate immune response. Early investigations both of macaques infected with H5N1 and on humans (Tran et al., 2005) suggest the critical pathology is that of a cytokine storm -the over-zealous host immune response contributing to the patients' demise in much the same manner as it does in deaths due to Gram-negative bacterial septicaemia through endotoxic shock.
Chemoprophylaxis and therapy are key interventions both in epidemics (Hayden et al., 1999 (Hayden et al., , 1997 and pandemics (Stohr, 2005) , and the early data from Vietnam (de Jong et al., 2005) indicates that the neuraminidase inhibitor (NI) oseltamivir can block viral RNA replication in patients. The overriding immune response is abrogated and the person survives. Some patients even benefited from the NI given late in the infection and under clinical conditions where only poor drug pharmacokinetics may have been achieved. In three of the eight patients who died, drug-resistant virus was isolated. There is robust laboratory data from cell cultures infected with H5N1 viruses, and also animal models that both licensed NIs, oseltamivir and zanamivir, significantly block the replication of influenza H5N1, as they do all subtypes of influenza tested (Gubareva et al., 2000) . Undoubtedly this class of drugs (which also includes peramivir) was a major discovery of the 20th century and in the 21st century, plans are in place in over 109 countries to use the NI class as therapy in the face of a pandemic. The UK, in common with many other EU countries, has stockpiled enough NIs to treat a quarter of the population. Retrospective analysis of 19th and 20th century pandemics has shown this figure to be a typical clinical attack rate over the duration of the outbreak, commonly 6 weeks. So in any one week around 5% of the population will be ill. Little consideration has yet been given to post-exposure prophylaxis, first described by Galbraith et al. (1969) in field trials of amantadine. In essence, not only is the index case of influenza in a family given the drug as therapy, but so are the rest of the family, having been already exposed to virus from contact with the index case but not yet showing any clinical signs. Theoretical analysis along with common sense and published data show this to be the most effective way of reducing virus spread in the community, giving around 80% protective efficacy (Welliver et al., 2001; Monto et al., 2002; Hayden et al., 2004) .
This year the world's production of NIs should reach 500-million courses, equivalent to that of influenza vaccines. Most comprehensive pandemic plans also include the important vaccine arm (Fedson, 2005) . Last year produced some very significant technical developments (Stephenson et al., 2005) . For example, reverse genetics methodologies for generating new vaccine strains; advances in cell culture vaccine production; highly effective adjuvant formulations; and several subunit HA/neuraminidase vaccines that have been shown to induce a broad immunity to a range of H5N1 virus clades with as little as two doses of 3.7 μg of HA.
The third component of a pandemic plan is the use of hand and surface hygiene with disinfectants proven to have virus destructive activity (Balasingam et al., personal communication) . It has been appreciated for many years since the transmission experiments at the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury that many respiratory viruses, influenza included, can be transferred from person to person by hands after sufferers have sneezed or coughed on their hands (Tyrrell & Fielder, 2002) .
Influenza is now recognized as a distinct global threat and the current global research investment, in excess of threebillion Euros, will undoubtedly encourage the development of new antivirals, most likely targeting the virus RNA replicase or HA. For example, the pyrazine compound, T-705, has shown excellent activity in efficacy models and is currently in development (Furuta et al., 2005) . In the longer term, another approach is to uncover the host cell proteins that are crucial for viral replication (Ludwig, 2005) . In any case, several NI-drug-resistant influenza mutants have been shown to be less spreadable and less virulent than fully susceptible wild-type viruses Carr et al., 2002; Yen et al., 2005) . Although NI-resistant viruses may emerge (Kiso et al., 2004) , they are predicted to be overtaken in the community by drug-sensitive viruses. Perhaps such resistant strains may act like an attenuated vaccine strain.
Amantadine and rimantadine were the first anti-influenza drugs to have activity in the clinic and community (Galbraith et al., 1969) , but their role in a pandemic plan has been questioned. In contrast to the NI inhibitors, resistance to these M2 blockers appears quickly and the resistant virus is fully virulent. Many influenza A (H3N2) viruses are M2-drug resistant and such viruses have spread in the community (Bright et al., 2005) . The majority of H5N1 viruses also have amantadine-resistant mutations in the M2 gene, but other clades are fully susceptible. Although being incorporated into strategic stockpiles, amantadine and rimantadine should not be used as monotherapy, only in combination with an NI.
For the first time, we have both knowledge about the origin and route of entry of pandemic influenza A virus into the human population (Webster et al., 2006) and, more importantly, we have an array of antivirals, vaccines, disinfectants and masks with which to combat it. Combined with enhanced global surveillance, we have the makings of an emergency tool kit. Mathematical modelling shows we can actually stop a pandemic at its epicentre should the world community report with speed before more than 50 or so people are affected, within 40 days after human-to-human spread has started in a community (Ferguson et al., 2005; Longini et al., 2005) .
It is scientifically achievable to stop the First Pandemic of the 21st century. We have some useful tools, and new antivirals will be a valuable addition. However, we should not be complacent.
At the very least we are "at the end of the beginning" (Churchill W [1942] after the Battle of El Alamein)
